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Introduction
Over the past seven years, the U.S. government has been involved in several multilateral and bilateral
trade negotiations that have led to one bilateral and two multilateral agreements whose provisions
have substantive implications for U.S. trade in agricultural commodities, including wheat, cattle, and
sugar, which are all important to Montana agricultural producers.  The first of these sets of trade
negotiations led to the bilateral Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA).
The second resulted in the current multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the provisions of which were accepted in principle by countries participating in the GATT process
on December 15, 1993, and implemented on January 1, 1995.  The third set of negotiations, initiated
under the Bush Administration, led to the multilateral North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which was approved by Congress in November 1993, and implemented on January 1,
1994.
Since 1945, many such agreements have been negotiated and signed by the U.S. and other countries.
For example, the first GATT agreement was signed in 1948; since then, there have been seven
additional rounds of negotiations and GATT agreements.  However, the three agreements signed by
the U.S. since the late 1980s have been substantively different from most previous agreements
because they each explicitly addressed the conditions under which trade in agricultural commodities
takes place.  The result has been that, to a greater or lesser degree, CFTA, NAFTA, and GATT have
altered or will alter the structure and behavior of world and domestic markets for agricultural
commodities that are of central importance to many Montana producers.  These commodities include
small grains (wheat and barley), sugar, and cattle and beef products.
The main purpose of this study is to provide a detailed description of the agricultural provisions of
NAFTA (which incorporates the provisions of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement preceding it)
and the current GATT for wheat, barley, sugar, and cattle and beef, and to discuss possible
implications for producers of these commodities.  However, bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements, while widely viewed as enhancing economic welfare by economists and many policy
makers, are almost always politically highly controversial.  The study therefore begins by describing
the general nature of these types of agreements.  Next, brief histories and descriptions of the general
provisions of NAFTA and GATT are presented, followed by overviews of the general agricultural
provisions of the two agreements.  The final section contains more detailed discussions of the
provisions and implications of the agreements that directly relate to wheat, barley, sugar, and
livestock products.  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               2  
Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Agreements
Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements are simply agreements negotiated between two (bilateral)
or more (multilateral) countries that change the conditions under which those countries’ citizens carry
out trade in a wide array of commodities.  Since 1945 (the end of World War II), these types of
agreements, and particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, have had a long history
in relation to trade between developed and developing countries outside of the former Eastern
European communist bloc and China.  The first GATT agreement, for example, was negotiated in
1948.  The consistent objective of the various GATT and most other multilateral agreements
negotiated since then has been to reduce restrictions on international trade, especially in manufactured
goods.  This objective has been motivated by two considerations.  First, it is believed that reducing
barriers to trade on a multilateral basis leads to a more efficient use of resources and generates higher
levels of output and economic welfare for the average citizen in each country.  Second, because
reducing trade barriers increases the volume of trade between countries and enhances economic
welfare through exchange between nations, it is also believed that multilateral trade agreements tend
to reduce incentives for political and physical conflict (war) between nations.  Similar rationales lie
behind less extensive agreements such as NAFTA and CFTA that involve smaller groups of
countries.
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The current broad-based interest among policy makers from many different countries in multilateral
initiatives to reduce barriers to trade began in the 1940s.  One important reason was the desire to
create an international environment that would prevent a third world war.  Another was the belief that
highly protectionist, high-tariff trade policies implemented by the United States and many European
countries during the early 1930s had contributed to extending and deepening the worldwide
depression of the 1930s.  These general concerns continued to provide the impetus for  multilateral
and bilateral trade negotiations throughout the Cold War era and into the late 1980s and the 1990s.
Major bilateral and multilateral trade agreements involve not only two or more countries, but also
many commodities.  Separate provisions of these agreements deal with different industries.  For
example, the most recent “Uruguay Round” of GATT negotiations led to an agreement that dealt
with industries as diverse as agriculture, automobiles, computers, computer software, television, and
general intellectual property rights.  Within agriculture, under both NAFTA and GATT, separate
provisions were negotiated for dozens of commodities.
The multi-commodity approach to reducing barriers to trade is usually adopted in trade negotiations
because it increases the probability that agreements on tariff reductions and other forms of trade
liberalization (such as the relaxation or removal of quantity restrictions on imports through import
quotas) will be reached by the participants.  Usually, the most active lobbying groups in the politics
of trade negotiations represent the industries and industry workers that are most directly affected by
the proposed changes in trade policy.  In the context of a single commodity, trade negotiations that
reduce import tariffs have adverse effects on the industry making the product in the importing
country, but benefit the industry in the exporting country.  As a result, when only one commodity is
involved, it is difficult for the importing country to agree to any trade liberalization.  If, however,
several commodities are involved, each country is likely to be an importer of some products and anTRADE RESEARCH CENTER 3
exporter of others.  Thus, while import-competing industries are likely to lobby against any trade
agreements, exporting industries are likely to lobby in support of them.  The upshot is that when many
commodities are involved, both bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations are more likely to be
successful because they will have support from effective lobbying groups (export industries) in both
countries (Yandle; Rayner, Ingersent, and Hine).
Another characteristic of multilateral trade negotiations is that they are usually incomplete; they do
not cover trade in every commodity, they do not generally result in the complete removal of trade
barriers, and they do not involve all trading countries.  Historically, many countries have viewed some
import-competing industries as “too important” to be included in trade negotiations, either because
of powerful industry lobbies or because the industries are genuinely perceived as vital to the economic
and defense interests of those countries.  Until the late 1980s, for example, agriculture clearly was
included in that category by major trading countries such as the member countries of  the EU, the
U.S., and Japan.   Thus, until relatively recently, by mutual consent, discussions about agricultural
2
trade policy have been declared to be off limits.  For similar reasons, with respect to most other
industries, many governments have been willing to negotiate partial reductions in trade barriers
(including tariff as well as non-tariff barriers such as import quotas and licenses, sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations, etc.), but have ruled out their complete elimination because the economic
costs borne by import-competing industries and the political costs to the governments involved would
be too large.
Many countries often do not participate in any given set of trade negotiations.  In some cases, the
reason is simply that they are not invited to the table.  For example, the 1994 North American Free
Trade Agreement was explicitly designed to involve only Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.  In other
cases, countries have been invited (or at least not deliberately excluded) but have chosen not to
participate.  For example, while the recent GATT trade negotiations involved 106 countries, they did
not involve all countries.  Most notably, partly by choice and partly because of political difficulties
with Western democracies (mainly over human rights issues), China did not participate despite that
country’s importance as both a buyer and seller in many international commodity markets, including
markets for major agricultural commodities such as wheat.
Finally, the fact that any given set of trade negotiations tends to leave many barriers to trade in place
creates incentives for future negotiations over trade.  As a result, many multilateral trade agreements
incorporate explicit or implicit accords between participating countries about further negotiations on
trade liberalization.  Under the 1994 GATT agreement, for example, explicit reductions in trade
barriers with respect to agricultural commodities have been negotiated.  In addition, the participating
countries have agreed to carry out further negotiations with respect to agricultural trade between
1995 and 2000 to determine further reductions in commodity-specific agricultural trade barriers
subsequent to the year 2000.  Less explicitly, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico continue to discuss the
possibility of expanding the current NAFTA agreement to include other countries in Central and
South America.  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               4  
An Overview of NAFTA and GATT
The recent NAFTA and GATT trade agreements are widely viewed as important trade policy
initiatives.  This section provides a brief history of the negotiations preceding each agreement and an
overview of the major general provisions of the agreements—except for the agricultural agreements,
which are discussed more extensively in a separate section.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
A.   A Brief History
The North American Free Trade Agreement among Canada, Mexico, and the United States is
intended to encourage the free flow of trade in goods and investment capital throughout North
America.  The agreement, signed by the leaders of the participating countries on December 17, 1993,
was ratified by the U.S. Congress in November of that year, but only after one of the most heated
political arguments about trade policy issues over the past 50 years.  The public debate culminated
with a nationally televised face-to-face confrontation between Vice President Al Gore and industrialist
Ross Perot.  At one stage in the debate when Congressional ratification of NAFTA seemed unlikely,
all of America’s then living Nobel Prize-winning economists, in clear accord, signed a joint letter
advocating that Congress should ratify NAFTA because it would yield net economic benefits for
citizens in all three countries.
The agreement was controversial because many U.S. manufacturing industries and some producers
of agricultural commodities (especially producers of sugar, fruits, and vegetables in California and
Florida) feared they would lose markets to competing Mexican and Canadian firms and farms with
lower cost structures (U.S. General Accounting Office; Huffbauer and Schott).  A particular concern
for some U.S. firms and environmentalists was that cost structures in Mexico were “unfairly” lower
because production facilities in Mexico were subject to much less stringent environmental regulations.
Thus environmental issues became an important part of the NAFTA debate.  Eventually, in part to
ensure ratification of the treaty in the U.S. Congress, a side agreement was developed to deal with
environmental concerns (Anderson).
For the most part, within the U.S., the NAFTA debate was about whether and how a more liberal set
of trade relationships should be established with Mexico.  The process of developing a substantially
liberalized, largely free trade environment between the U.S. and Canada had been accomplished
earlier through the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CFTA).  The final text of the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement was agreed on by trade negotiators in December 1987, approved by
both the U.S. and Canadian legislative assemblies in 1988, and came into effect on January 1, 1989.
The agreement was extensive and incorporated trade liberalization provisions for many sectors of the
Canadian and U.S. economies, including the elimination of general tariffs on all commodities other
than commodities for which specific exceptions were made in the 18 chapters of the agreement.  In
addition, under Article 401 of the agreement, the two countries agreed that:TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 5
Neither party shall increase any customs duty, or introduce any customs duty, on any
goods originating in the territory of the other party, except as otherwise provided in
this Agreement.
The agreement also included provisions for reductions of existing tariffs, again under Article 401, and
for the reduction and removal of other impediments to trade such as import quotas and import
licensing requirements.  As a result, by 1994, more than 70 percent of merchandise trade (trade in
goods) between the U.S. and Canada entered duty free.  In contrast, before the CFTA, Canada’s
average tariff (weighted by trade) on goods imported from the U.S. was about 9.9 percent, while the
U.S. average tariff on goods imported from Canada was about 3.3 percent (U.S. General Accounting
Office).
The CFTA negotiations had been as controversial in Canada as the NAFTA negotiations were in the
U.S., and for similar reasons.   Many Canadian manufacturing sectors perceived U.S. competitors to
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have potentially large cost advantages and feared that domestic markets and jobs would be lost to
U.S. companies.  Also, the CFTA implied larger tariff cuts by Canada than by the U.S. because, as
noted above, before 1988, Canada had higher tariff barriers.  Thus, during the NAFTA negotiations,
both U.S. and Canadian negotiators focused on issues concerned with liberalizing trade with Mexico,
both because similar issues had already been resolved between Canada and the U.S. and because
reopening those issues might create too much political heat.
With respect to Mexico, U.S. negotiators claimed that one primary objective in developing NAFTA
was to ensure that Mexico would make permanent commitments to the economic and political
reforms that it had implemented between 1985 and 1993.  These reforms, it was argued, had created
a more stable environment for U.S. exporters and investors.  A second important objective was to
reduce Mexican tariffs and other trade restrictions that were limiting the access of U.S. manufacturing
firms, providers of financial and other services, and farmers to a large and growing market.  Canadian
negotiators had similar objectives and, in addition, did not want an independent bilateral agreement
between the U.S. and Mexico to undercut the position of Canadian firms that exported goods and
services to the U.S.
B.   NAFTA’s Major Provisions
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The intent of NAFTA is to create a free trade area among Canada, the U.S., and Mexico through the
elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade over the 15-year period 1994S2009.   The agreement
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covers five general areas: (1) tariff reductions; (2) the removal of non-tariff trade barriers; (3)
financial investment; (4) trade rules, including dispute settlement procedures; and (5) environmental
issues.
1.   Tariff Reductions
Tariff duties levied by each of the three countries on imports from the other two countries are to be
phased out over a 15-year period between 1994 and 2009, with the bulk of the tariff reductions to
be completed by 2004.  Different general schedules for the reduction and removal of tariffs were  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               6  
created for manufacturers, agricultural commodities, and textiles; however, regardless of broad
categories, individual tariff reduction schedules have been developed for each type of commodity.
All Mexican tariffs on U.S. manufactured products will be eliminated by 2004.  However, in contrast,
some U.S. products are defined as import sensitive, so U.S. tariffs on imports of these commodities
will be phased out over a 15-year period; some U.S. tariffs will remain in place until 2009.
Both Mexico and the U.S. have provided exemptions from or refunds of tariffs for imports from other
countries used as inputs in domestic manufacturing industries.  These exemptions, known as duty
drawbacks, provide implicit subsidies to the industries using these imported inputs and give them
a cost advantage in certain markets.  Thus, under NAFTA, duty drawbacks are also to be phased out.
Tariff rates on imports from NAFTA trade partners cannot be increased, and negotiated tariff
reductions cannot be rescinded or delayed unless a safeguard action is being taken.  Safeguard
actions may be taken to delay tariff reductions or even increase trade barriers on a temporary basis
when planned or actual NAFTA tariff reductions threaten or cause serious injury to a domestic
industry because of increases in imports.  Then scheduled tariff reductions may be delayed and the
phase-out schedule recalibrated to ease the transition to a free trade environment for the affected
domestic industry and workers in that industry.  Under NAFTA, temporary import relief measures
through the implementation of higher tariffs and/or delays in tariff reductions are permitted for up to
four years.  It is worth noting that similar safeguard actions are allowed on a bilateral basis (between
two countries) under GATT, but only where imports have caused injury to an industry.  However,
under NAFTA, if a country uses a safeguard action to protect a domestic industry, it must
compensate the countries whose export industries are affected or be subject to retaliation in relation
to other commodities.  In addition, safeguard actions can be taken only after a country has held
extensive public hearings and gathered and evaluated all relevant information in an objective manner
in order to make a finding of injury.  The intent of NAFTA is therefore that safeguard actions should
be difficult to invoke because they are exceptional measures to be used only when exceptional
problems arise.
2.   Non-Tariff Trade Barriers
Generally, all prohibitions and quantitative restrictions on imports from and exports to NAFTA
partners are to be removed.  Thus, commodity-specific import quotas and import licenses must be
removed, although border restrictions may be imposed to protect human, animal, or plant life or the
environment.  In addition, all Customs User Fees are to be phased out by June 1999.  Further, eligible
persons may bring with them tools of their trades on a duty-free basis and, beginning in 1998, goods
repaired in other NAFTA countries may reenter the country of origin on a duty-free basis.  The clear
intent of these provisions is to ensure that none of the three NAFTA countries restrict trade through
the back door by means other than tariffs.
In addition, because countries have often tried to restrict trade on the basis of sanitary and other
health considerations, NAFTA includes provisions that develop clear protocols for dealing with
sanitary and phytosanitary issues.  Each country is free to develop and apply its own sanitary and
phytosanitary standards as long as those standards are based on sound scientific methods.  AllTRADE RESEARCH CENTER 7
nonconforming imports may be banned.  Disputes about sanitary and phytosanitary standards are
referred to a standing committee of the Trilateral Commission that is responsible for monitoring
NAFTA and providing mechanisms for dispute settlement.
3.   Financial Investment
Under NAFTA, regardless of where they are located, all NAFTA parties in a financial investment are
to be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner according to the national treatment of domestic parties
in the country of interest.  In addition, no limitations are to be imposed on NAFTA citizens with
respect to equity holdings, nor can investors from NAFTA countries be required to divest asset
holdings in another NAFTA country because of nationality.  Moreover, NAFTA prohibits member
countries from applying business performance rules to NAFTA investors.  These rules require foreign
owners of businesses to export a given level or percentage of goods, make purchases from local
suppliers, restrict imports for use in the business or sale from other countries, transfer technology to
domestic entities, or act as an exclusive supplier of the firm’s goods and services to a specific region
or market.  In addition, NAFTA prohibits restrictions of transfers of funds into or out of a member
country by entities in the other member countries when those transfers are related to income from
investments or their sale or liquidation.  The only exception to these provisions is when a member
country is confronted with a serious balance-of-payment problem.  NAFTA also protects investors
in the event of a direct or indirect expropriation or nationalization of assets by permitting
expropriations: (1) only for a public purpose; (2) only on a nondiscriminatory basis (that is, only if
the assets of all private investors in all NAFTA countries are expropriated); and (3) only on payment
of full compensation without delay at fair market value.  Finally, an explicit dispute resolution
mechanism has been established for breaches of obligations under the investment provisions.  This
mechanism involves international arbitration rather than reliance on the domestic courts of the country
hosting the investment.
4.   Trade Rules, Including Dispute Settlement Procedures
Under NAFTA, a Trilateral Trade Commission (TTC) with representatives from the three countries
has responsibility for further negotiation and elaboration of the agreement and resolving inter-
government disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the agreement.   The TTC
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consists of panels and committees that have responsibility for settling trade disputes.  However,
permanent working groups provide comprehensive analysis for the TTC panels and committees in five
subject areas (rules of origin, customs, standards-related measures, trade and competition,
and temporary entry by business persons).  The steps involved in any inter-government dispute
are as follows: (1) direct consultations between the disputing countries, between agencies, and,
if necessary, at the TTC itself; (2) referral of the dispute to an independent panel of experts;
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(3) dissemination of panel recommendations and findings; and (4) resolution of the dispute or
retaliation by the injured party.  This process is applicable for disputes about trade in physical goods
and financial services.  In addition, NAFTA provisions establish procedures by which private disputes,
including disputes between private investors and state governments, are subject to binding third-party
arbitration.  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               8  
5.   Environmental Issues
NAFTA provides relatively little direct guidance about environmental issues.  The agreement does
state that each country is free to establish its own environmental standards (as is the case with sanitary
and phytosanitary standards).  However, it also states that each country should develop standards that
are compatible with those of other countries.  This provision has been interpreted by some analysts
to imply that Mexico will have to develop more stringent environmental regulations over the next few
years.  In addition, Article 104 of the agreement deals with potential conflicts between NAFTA and
other international environmental agreements by allowing other agreements to have precedence over
NAFTA rules as long as the parties involved adopt the provisions of the other agreements closest to
those incorporated in NAFTA.
8
The most substantial environmental issues associated with NAFTA are dealt with in the 1992 trilateral
(Canada-U.S.-Mexico) side or parallel agreement specifically directed toward environmental
regulation of activities on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border.  This agreement created the
Integrated Environmental Plan for the U.S.-Mexico Border Areas.  The key provisions of this
agreement establish a Border Environmental Advisory Committee and joint initiatives in relation
to water and air quality standards, hazardous waste standards, emergency response to environmental
crises, and enforcement of regulations.  The side agreement is widely viewed as having been essential
for U.S. Congressional approval of NAFTA.  It was developed in response to pressures from U.S.
environmental lobby groups and U.S. firms and workers worried about job and market losses through
competition from border area entities located in Mexico to avoid compliance with, and the
accompanying costs of, U.S. environmental regulations.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
A.   A Brief History
The most recent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is intended to encourage and
expand the free flow of trade in goods and services among the 128 signatory countries to the 1994
GATT agreement.  The current GATT is the outcome of eight multilateral rounds of trade
negotiations between large and small economies that began in 1947 with what was known as the
Geneva Round.  The first GATT agreement, which came into force in 1948, involved 23 countries
and resulted in approximately 45,000 concessions on tariff rates among the participants.  These
concessions were largely associated with manufactured and processed products and did not include
agricultural commodities or textiles.  In the six rounds of GATT negotiations which followed between
1949 (the Annecy Round in France) and 1979 (the Tokyo Round), the focus was mainly on
negotiating tariff reductions with new participating countries and further general across-the-board
reductions in tariffs on manufactured and processed products.  During the Kennedy Round of GATT
negotiations in the 1960s, the U.S. did attempt to include agriculture in the GATT process, largely
in order to negotiate reductions in tariffs levied by the European Community on U.S. agricultural
exports such as wheat, but its efforts were unsuccessful (Premakumar et al.).
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In the early 1980s, at the highest levels of government, the U.S. and some other countries were
concerned about an apparent worldwide surge in protectionist (high tariff and non-tariff barrier)
policies that were impeding those countries’ efforts in specific export markets.  Serious reservations
were also expressed about the rising use of direct and hidden subsidies for exports that were enabling
some countries’ export industries to “dump” goods at very low prices in other countries’ markets.
The United States, for example, had particular concerns about “unfair” competition from Japanese
automobile and computer chip producers and the European Community wine industry in U.S. markets
(Schott).
In addition, by the mid-1980s, the U.S. and other major agricultural exporters such as Australia and
New Zealand had become increasingly worried by heavily subsidized exports of many agricultural
commodities by the European Union.  For example, in the early 1970s, the EU had been a net
importer of wheat, but by the late 1980s, it had become the second largest wheat exporter behind the
U.S., pushing Canada into third place.  Similarly, by the late 1980s, the EU had become the largest
exporter of dairy products, poultry, and eggs, and the second largest exporter of barley and beef.
These exports were also heavily subsidized, creating a large fiscal burden for both taxpayers and food
consumers within the EU and considerable resentment among producers in other exporting countries
(Premakumar et al.; Rayner, Ingersent, and Hine).  In addition, almost all of the largest agricultural
exporting countries expressed serious reservations about the degree to which some importing nations,
especially Japan and other Pacific Rim nations, were protecting their domestic agricultural producers
from foreign competition through high tariffs and/or a variety of non-tariff barriers such as import
quotas, import licensing arrangements, and control of agricultural imports through government “state
trading” enterprises (Hathaway and Ingo).  Thus, pressure built for substantial reform in agricultural
trade policies, both within the EU and among other agricultural exporting nations.  In a roughly
parallel development, the rapid process of innovation in computer software and hardware and in
biotechnology also led several countries to raise questions about the international treatment of
intellectual property rights.  In addition, several countries wished to bring world trade policies in
textiles under the GATT umbrella.  Previously, many countries had been participants in multilateral
Multi-Fiber Agreements, which limited access to many importing countries’ protected domestic
textiles markets (Schott).
In 1986, at the ministerial/cabinet level GATT meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, senior politicians
and government representatives from 92 countries initiated the eighth GATT round of trade
negotiations with the declaration of a major goal:
To achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures
affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more
effective GATT rules and disciplines.
Significantly, by stating that all measures affecting agricultural trade should be subject to GATT
disciplines, the Punta del Este meeting of government ministers emphasized that all agricultural
income support policies could be subject to negotiated revision under the GATT process.  In addition,
the eighth round also received an explicit mandate to address the treatment of intellectual property
rights (Schott).  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               10  
Putting all “trade-distorting” agricultural domestic and trade policies on the table created substantial
challenges for GATT trade negotiators.  In many developed countries, such as the U.S., Canada,
Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, agricultural lobbies have been very effective in
garnering support for domestic and trade programs that enhance farm incomes and protect domestic
producers from competition from other countries.  Under the guidance of the Reagan Administration,
however, in July 1987, U.S. negotiators decided to pursue an aggressive negotiation policy by
proposing that all countries abolish all agricultural policies that were “trade distorting.”  Thus, the
U.S. argued for the removal of any programs that restricted or prevented access to domestic markets
by exporting countries or those which allowed producers in exporting countries to provide more of
a commodity at lower prices to world markets.  If the U.S. proposal had been adopted, trade policies
such as export subsidies and import tariffs and import quotas would have been abolished.  In addition,
any programs that encouraged domestic producers to expand production (such as price support
programs and input subsidy programs) would also have been ended.  This U.S. proposal was simply
politically infeasible, and by the end of 1988, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations had stalled.
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A new Republican administration under George Bush, strongly committed to trade liberalization,
attempted to kickstart the GATT negotiation in April 1989 by putting forward a new U.S. proposal
on agriculture which argued for substantial and progressive reduction in agricultural protection rather
than the complete elimination of domestic support.  Later that year, the Bush Administration also
proposed the concept of “tarrification” under which non-tariff barriers such as import quotas would
be converted over time into tariff barriers and then reduced.  In addition, under this Bush
Administration proposal, general levels of domestic support for agricultural commodities would be
reduced, export subsidies would be cut, and a set of rules for dealing with trade barriers resulting
from sanitary and phytosanitary regulations would be established.  All of these proposals were
eventually incorporated into the final version of the Uruguay Round GATT agreement.
In late 1990, both the U.S. and the Cairns Group, including countries such as Australia, New Zealand,
and Argentina,  argued for very large reductions in export subsidies (up to 90 percent cuts for each
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commodity) and general domestic support (up to 75 percent cuts for each commodity) for agriculture.
The EU responded by proposing an average sectoral reduction in domestic support of 30 percent;
then in December, at a ministerial-level meeting in Brussels, the GATT negotiations again deadlocked
over agriculture because of objections by the EU, Korea, and Japan to negotiations with respect to
agriculture.
The negotiation logjam created by the reluctance of the EU to introduce radical changes in its
agricultural support programs began to break down in 1991 and 1992, partly because of concerns
about the potential breakdown of GATT itself.  More importantly, in 1991, low world prices for
major agricultural commodities such as wheat raised the budgetary costs of the EU agricultural
support programs to levels unacceptable to several major EU member countries including the UK and
Germany.  The EU budget crisis in 1991 set the stage for major reforms to the EU’s agricultural
support program, the Common Agricultural Policy, in 1992.  In 1991, Arthur Dunkel, the director
general of GATT, had proposed specific cuts relative to levels of domestic support, levels of trade
protection, and levels of exports over the period 1989S1990.  These included a 20 percent reduction
in general subsidies for each commodity, a 36 percent reduction in the value of domestic export
subsidies, a 24 percent reduction in the volume of commodities receiving export subsidies, and anTRADE RESEARCH CENTER 11
average reduction in import tariffs of 36 percent with a minimum tariff cut of 15 percent for any given
agricultural commodity.  The 1992 EU agricultural reforms incorporated most of these proposals.
The final step in the resolution of the agricultural component of the Uruguay GATT agreement took
place in November of 1992 when, in bilateral negotiations that resulted in the Blair House Accord,
the U.S. and the EU developed a mutually acceptable agreement on agriculture.  Under the Blair
House Accord, the U.S. agreed to a 21 percent reduction in the volume of exports receiving subsidies
and only an average reduction of 20 percent in domestic support (rather than 20 percent reductions
for each commodity).  In addition, a long-standing dispute over trade in oilseeds was resolved.  It
should be noted that not all EU member countries were satisfied by the Blair House Accord.  For
example, Professor M. Allais, France’s sole winner of a Nobel Prize in economics, was reported by
the Wall Street Journal to have claimed the agricultural agreement would undermine the basis of
French culture.  Moreover, French farmers lobbied heavily against approval of the agreement
(“Handle With Care,” The Economist).  However, somewhat atypically, in the end the French
government did not step back from its agricultural deal with the U.S. (“The Uruguay Round …,” The
Economist).
Once agriculture had been sorted out, intellectual property rights became a bone of contention.
However, in December 1993, a new GATT agreement was signed by 117 countries.  Finally, in April
1994, the Ministerial meeting of GATT participants at Marrakesh endorsed the agreement after
detailed Country Schedules for tarrification, tariff reductions, and other commodity-specific
provisions had been negotiated in the interim.
B.   GATT’s General Provisions
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The 1994 GATT agreement extended many preexisting accords about trade policies negotiated in the
seven previous GATT rounds.  However, the Uruguay Round resulted in several major trade
liberalization initiatives and innovations, which are the focus of this section.  In addition to trade
liberalization in agriculture, discussed in detail below, major components of the 1994 GATT involved
trade liberalization in relation to textiles and apparel, general tariff liberalization, and government
procurement.  In addition, some important changes were made in trade rules dealing with dumping
and anti-dumping measures that can be used by damaged parties to offset or “countervail” dumping
practices.  The 1994 GATT also addressed three new areas: trade in services, investment, and
intellectual property rights.  Finally, the agreement dealt with several institutional issues including the
creation of the World Trade Organization, dispute settlement procedures, and trade policy review
mechanisms.  This overview begins by examining the institutional provisions of the 1994 GATT.  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               12  
1. The World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement,
and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created under the Final Act of the 1994 GATT.  Its
members are all signatories to the 1994 GATT that have deposited schedules of commitments to meet
the obligations of that agreement.  Currently, 128 countries are therefore members of the WTO.
Another 33 countries (including China and the Republics of the Former Soviet Union) are likely to
join, or are considering joining, the WTO.
The WTO operates with a Secretariat (consisting largely of the previous staff of the GATT), which
serves the WTO itself and is therefore directly responsible to the member countries.  Member
countries agree to abide by the terms of the 1994 GATT, including the agreements about trade in
services and intellectual property rights.  The members of the WTO also agree to follow the dispute
resolution procedures established under the 1994 GATT.
The GATT dispute resolution procedures were also modified and unified in the 1994 agreement with
the objective of making them more timely, more efficient, and more effective.  Under the current
procedures established in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, as was the case prior to the 1994 GATT, only member nations can initiate dispute
resolution procedures against other countries.  However, private groups within a country can and do
bring potential violations of the GATT to the attention of their governments.
Once a nation initiates a complaint, the dispute resolution procedures operate within specific and
tightly defined time limits.  First, a 60-day period is established during which the parties attempt to
resolve the dispute through consultations.  If consultations fail, the party claiming injury may then
request the establishment of a three-person dispute resolution panel recommended by the WTO
Secretariat which must be set up within 25 to 60 days after the initial request.  The panel must issue
its report within six to nine months and the recommendations, including those concerning any
payments for damages, must be acted upon quite rapidly.  Failure of the “guilty” party to pay
compensation and/or comply with the recommendation then leads to a finding that the injured party
may implement retaliatory measures.
Although these procedures may seem cumbersome, they represent a major reform of the GATT
dispute resolution process by imposing strict time limits on the establishment of panels and the
periods within which the panels must report.  Also, the selection of panel members is now less heavily
influenced by either of the parties to the trade dispute, especially the country accused of the trade
agreement infraction.
Finally, with respect to institutional arrangements, Annex 3 of the 1994 GATT formally establishes
a Trade Policy Review Mechanism under which periodic reviews are to be undertaken concerning
trade and other economic policies of member countries that affect world trade.  These country-by-
country reviews, introduced on a temporary basis in 1988,  are to be carried out by a permanent
Trade Policy Review Board on the basis of a report provided by the country itself and an independent
report prepared by the WTO Secretariat staff.  Major trading countries will be reviewed biannually,
and all countries must be reviewed within five years of the 1994 agreement (that is, by the year 2000).TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 13
The intent is to provide up-to-date information on the degree to which member countries are meeting
their GATT obligations.  The process may also enable the WTO to establish effective benchmarks
against which future trade liberalization negotiations can be developed.
2. Textiles and Apparel
Prior to the 1994 GATT, trade in textiles was largely regulated and restricted through a series of
bilateral agreements developed under the umbrella of a series of multilateral Multi-Fiber Agreements
(MFAs).  The MFAs were really not designed to liberalize trade in textiles and apparel, but to
establish and legitimize a complex multi-country system of import quotas and tariffs.  Under the 1994
GATT, the system of bilateral quotas negotiated under the MFA is to be phased out over a 10-year
period, albeit quite slowly, as the phase-out process will begin with the least restrictive quotas and
finish with the most restrictive quotas.  In addition, the 1994 GATT establishes a freeze on any new
restrictions on trade in textiles and apparel.  Despite the fact that the agreement provides individual
countries with mechanisms to prevent “sudden surges” in imports as quotas are reduced (in effect,
allowing them to delay implementing their commitments to remove textiles trade barriers), this
component of the 1994 GATT represents a remarkable accomplishment in trade liberalization.
Historically, many countries’ textiles sectors have enjoyed very high levels of protection from foreign
competition and, like agriculture, have been exempted from all previous GATT negotiations.
3. General Tariff Liberalization
In addition to developing trade liberalization agreements for agriculture and textiles (sectors
previously exempted from the GATT), under the Uruguay Round, substantial proportional tariff cuts
were also negotiated for manufactured commodities, although these tariff rates were generally already
quite low (an average 6.3 percent prior to the Uruguay Round).  Average percentage reductions in
tariff levels for industrial goods are reported in Table 1 for developed countries, developing countries,
and economies in transition from communism—including, for example, the Republics of the Former
Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.  The proportional average cuts in industrial
goods tariffs range from 20 percent in developing countries to 38 percent in developed countries, and
the proportional cuts implemented by some countries, such as Canada, are even higher.  Had no
progress been made on trade liberalization in agriculture, textiles, and other areas previously excluded
from GATT negotiations, these cuts would represent a substantial movement toward a freer world
trade environment; furthermore, they are larger than those achieved for the same commodities under
the Tokyo Round in 1979.  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               14  
 Table 1.  Average Reductions in Tariffs Under the Uruguay Round
Trade Weights for Average Tariffs Average Tariff
Reductions
(percentages) Country or Country Groups Pre-Uruguay Round Post-Uruguay Round
Developed Countries: 6.3 3.9 38
Canada 9.0 4.8 47
European Union 5.7 3.6 37
Japan 3.9 1.7 56
United States 4.6 3.0 34
Developing Countries 15.3 12.3 20
Economies in Transition 8.6 6.0 30
   Source:  Schott, The Uruguay Round: An Assessment, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, November 1994.
4. Government Procurement
One area in which discrimination against foreign producers of goods and services often applies is
government purchases or procurement.  The 1994 GATT includes a new Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA) which reinforces rules to provide open and nondiscriminatory access to public
tenders for the provision of goods and services.  However, not all WTO member countries have to
abide by this agreement, which is therefore described as a plurilateral agreement, and many have
chosen not to sign the GPA.  Nevertheless, many large trading countries, including the U.S., the EU,
Japan, and Korea, have made substantial concessions in permitting foreign entities access to the
market for government procurement contracts.
5. Trade Rules: Anti-Dumping Procedures
For many years, under Article VI of GATT, individual countries have been unilaterally able to impose
“countervailing” tariffs and other import restrictions on imports being dumped, or offered for sale
below their normal world market value in their domestic markets, by other countries.  It is believed
the right to countervail against dumping has often been abused because it is inherently difficult to
determine what constitutes the normal market value of a product.  The 1994 GATT includes a new
anti-dumping agreement which, through new common methodological and procedural rules, tries to
standardize and make more transparent the basis for anti-dumping actions by individual governments.
The new methodology rules specify both the data needed in establishing a case that dumping is taking
place and the methods by which the data should be used to estimate the degree of “below-cost” price
cutting by the exporting country.  The procedural innovations include a de minimus rule under whichTRADE RESEARCH CENTER 15
dumping investigations are terminated if prices are being cut by less than 2 percent of the normal
export price or the price cuts are applied to less than 3 percent of total imports of the product from
all sources by the importing country.  The purpose of this rule is to avoid the use of anti-dumping
policies when the problem is relatively trivial.  In addition, all anti-dumping measures must now
include sunset clauses under which anti-dumping measures expire after five years unless further
review indicates that dumping is continuing.  Finally, disputes that arise because of anti-dumping
actions are now subject to the new GATT dispute settlement process discussed above.
6. Trade in Services
Trade in services (tourism, financial services, computer support, shipping, air transport, etc.)
represents a major component of international trade and is particularly important in the U.S.  During
the 1990s, annual U.S. exports of services to other countries have been well in excess of $150 billion
and amount to about 15 percent of worldwide exports of services.  A major U.S. concern during the
Uruguay Round of the GATT was to establish some degree of trade liberalization with respect to
trade in services.  To some degree, this initiative was successful.  One component of the 1994 GATT
agreements is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  Like the Government
Procurement Agreement (to which it is quite closely related because of the importance of purchases
of services by government agencies), the GATS is described as a plurilateral agreement under GATT
because not all WTO member countries are participants.
GATS has three main components.  First, a set of general obligations has been established that applies
to all service sectors.  Second, a set of sectoral annexes details how the rules apply to each sector.
Third, specific commitments have been made by individual countries for each service sector and types
of services within each sector.  Trade in services is defined very broadly.  It includes cross-border
supply of a service (for example, a U.S. bank carrying out international currency exchanges for a
Canadian or British company), movement of the consumer to the country of the supplier (for
example, Japanese tourists visiting Glacier National Park), movement of the supplier to the country
of the consumer (that is, rules allowing suppliers to establish a legal presence in other countries), and
the temporary movement of employees who are residents in the supplier’s home country to the
foreign country to provide services (for example, an employee of a New York law firm working in
London on a temporary basis for a British client).  In fact, under GATS, the signatory countries have
made very modest commitments to liberalize market access rules and other barriers to trade in
services.  However, the 1994 GATT agreement is the first to bring trade in services under the
umbrella of multilateral trade negotiations.
7. International Investment
While NAFTA achieved substantial progress with respect to the treatment of foreign investment by
member countries, the Uruguay Round of GATT achieved relatively little.  However, some progress
was made in proscribing certain measures that allowed foreign investment to be treated differently
than domestic investment.  These proscriptions pertain to local content, trade balancing, and foreign
exchange balancing requirements.  These changes in the rules pertaining to the treatment of
investment measures (often called TRIMS), however, are modest.  The reason for GATT’s poor  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               16  
record in relation to the treatment of foreign investment is simple: many countries in the developing
world (including relatively large countries such as Brazil and India) have declared their treatment of
foreign investment to be off limits to negotiators.
8.  Intellectual Property Rights
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an important
component of the 1994 GATT.  At the outset of the Uruguay Round, concerns about breaches of
intellectual property rights by developing countries were widespread in developed economies such
as the U.S. and the member countries of the EU.  Thus, intellectual property rights issues were placed
on the agenda for GATT negotiators at the outset of the Uruguay Round in 1986.  However, with
some notable exceptions (including China), many developing countries had unilaterally developed
more effective intellectual property rights protection laws; thus, a developed country/developing
country confrontation did not arise over these issues.  However, during the eight-year period of the
negotiations, technological advances, especially in relation to computing and biotechnology, created
a host of new trade-related intellectual property rights issues that had not been resolved in previous
international agreements.
The TRIPS agreement, which incorporates all of the provisions of all previous international
agreements on intellectual property rights, is the first to establish a comprehensive set of trade rules
for the protection of copyrights, patents, trademarks, industrial designs, trade secrets, and
semiconductor designs.  The protections provided are quite extensive.  For example, copyrights for
computer programs and data bases are protected for 20 years, while copyrights for movies, sound
recordings, and books are protected for 50 years.  In addition, all patents filed after the establishment
of the WTO receive 20 years of patent protection (though previously filed patents are only covered
by previous agreements).  Trademarks receive protection initially for seven years, and applications
can be made thereafter for seven-year renewals.  It should be noted that the intellectual property
rights provisions of the 1994 GATT and NAFTA are very similar, largely because the NAFTA
provisions dealing with intellectual property rights were developed with the GATT agreement in
mind, although some differences exist with respect to specific arrangements (for example, trademarks
are protected for 10-year periods under NAFTA).  In addition, under GATT, some countries have
up to 11 years to phase in intellectual property rights legislation, while the equivalent NAFTA
provisions came into effect when the agreement was signed.
The General Agricultural Provisions
of NAFTA and GATT
As we have seen, both NAFTA and GATT deal with a broad array of trade-related issues that cover
almost every aspect of trade between the participating countries.  In both agreements, the provisions
concerning agriculture distinguish the agreements as landmark events in trade negotiations.  This
section provides a detailed overview of the general elements of these agricultural provisions and a
brief discussion of their implications for future developments in agricultural policy.  As in the previous
section, the agricultural provisions of NAFTA are discussed first and those of GATT second.TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 17
Both agreements address issues of market access (the removal of non-tariff barriers to agricultural
trade), special agricultural safeguards (policies to ensure an orderly transition to liberalized trade),
export subsidies, measures of internal support (domestic policies that affect and distort trade
in agricultural products), sanitary and phytosanitary standards (regulations restricting agricultural
trade because of concerns about animal, human, and plant life), rules of origin (which deal with the
issue of from which countries products receiving favorable treatment under the agreements can
originate), and commercial dispute resolution.  In addition, provisions in NAFTA also address
issues associated with grades and quality standards.
The Agricultural Provisions of NAFTA
The general agricultural provisions of NAFTA are outlined in Table 2 on the following page.  The
agricultural component of NAFTA involves two bilateral agreements—one between Mexico and the
U.S., and the other between Mexico and Canada.  As noted above, under NAFTA, agricultural trade
between Canada and the U.S. is governed by the terms of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
which was implemented in 1989.  The focus here is on the agreement between Mexico and the U.S.
The implementation period for the agricultural agreement began on January 1, 1994, as did the
implementation period for many of the components of NAFTA.  Beginning in January 1994, all tariffs
on agricultural commodities are scheduled to be phased out, although the transition period for specific
commodities varies from five to 15 years.  Full implementation of the agricultural agreement is to be
achieved by 2008.
1. Market Access
Several important initiatives were implemented to improve access for U.S. agricultural products to
Mexican markets and also to improve access for Mexican products to U.S. markets.  Adjustments
in trade policies concerning tariffs and quotas were to be established in relation to policies extant
during the base period of 1989S91.
Under the agreement, all import quotas and quantitative restrictions were eliminated immediately.
For many commodities, these contracts and other non-tariff barrier restrictions to trade were
replaced by tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), which were designed initially to provide the same degree of
protection to domestic producers of import-competing products.  Under a TRQ, a fixed amount of
the product of interest is allowed to enter a country and be subjected to either a very low tariff or no
tariff.  Any additional imports can be imported only if a much higher tariff is paid.  Thus, for example,
in 1994, Mexico could ship 1,500 metric tons of products with a sugar content in excess of 65
percent to the U.S. without paying a tariff.  Any exports of such commodities in excess of 1,500
metric tons (described in the agreement as over-quota shipments) were subject to prohibitively high
tariffs ranging from 91.2 to 120.3 percent.  TRQs have been established for several major
commodities by the U.S., including sugar, peanuts, cotton, corn, and orange juice, as well as several
other horticultural crops such as tomatoes, squash, eggplant, watermelon, and chili peppers.  Mexico
has also established TRQs for several commodities including pork, potatoes, malt barley, poultry,
eggs, nonfat dry milk, corn, animal fats and oils, and dry edible beans.  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               18  
 Table 2.  NAFTA: Summary of Agricultural Provisions Concerning the U.S. and MexicoTRADE RESEARCH CENTER 19
IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD:
   P Beginning January 1, 1994, all tariffs are to be phased out over a period of 5 to 15 years.
   P All agricultural provisions are to be fully implemented by the year 2008.
MARKET ACCESS:
   P The base period is established as 1989S91.
   P All quotas and quantitative restrictions to agricultural trade between the United States and Mexico are eliminated
immediately.
   P Non-tariff barriers are converted to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) to equal the protection of the former non-tariff
barrier.
   P TRQs are increased annually over the transition period, generally at a rate of 3 percent per year.
   P The over-quota tariffs are reduced to zero over a 10- to 15-year period, depending on the product.
   P Mexico’s import licensing system for the United States is eliminated.
   P Section 22 quotas on imports from Mexico are replaced by NAFTA provisions.
SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL SAFEGUARDS:
   P Quota amounts will enter at preferential NAFTA tariffs, and over-quota imports will be subject to Most Favored
Nation (MFN) tariff rates, which are not to exceed rates in place on July 1, 1991.
   P Quotas receiving the preferential NAFTA tariff will generally be based on the highest annual import volume during
the 1989S91 period
   P Quotas will grow at a 3 percent compounded annual rate
EXPORT SUBSIDIES:
   P Export subsidies within the free trade area are inappropriate except to counter the subsidized imports from a non-
NAFTA country.
   P The United States and Canada are allowed to provide export subsidies into the Mexican market to counter
subsidized exports from other countries.
INTERNAL SUPPORT:
   P Under NAFTA, all parties should endeavor to move toward domestic support policies that have minimal trade- or
production-distorting effects, or policies exempt from domestic support reduction commitments under GATT.
GRADE AND QUALITY STANDARDS:
   P The United States and Mexico agree that when either country applies a classification, grading, or marketing
measure for a domestic product destined for processing, no less favorable treatment will be given to like products
imported for processing.
SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY (SPS) MEASURES:
   P SPS measures are not to be disguised as restrictions on trade.
   P NAFTA explicitly recognizes each country’s right to determine the level of protection necessary to ensure
continued agricultural health.
   P SPS measures are to be scientifically based.
   P Local governments may require more stringent standards, as long as they are scientifically defensible and are
administered in a forthright and expeditious manner.
RULES OF ORIGIN:
   P The products to be traded with NAFTA preference are required to be of North American origin; no non-NAFTA
products are to receive NAFTA preference.
   P The de minimis provision, which allows a final NAFTA good to contain a small quantity of the same kind of good
from a non-NAFTA source, is to be established.
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
   P NAFTA established a trilateral advisory committee to provide a forum for resolving private commercial disputes
that arise in connection with transactions in agricultural products.
   P The three countries established a joint Committee on Agricultural Trade.
   P The NAFTA Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures will facilitate SPS disputes.  NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE ...               20  
Over the transition period, the restrictions on agricultural trade associated with the new TRQs are
to be phased out through a dual process.  First, the quota subject to low or no tariffs is to be
increased each year, generally at an annual rate of 3 percent.  Second, tariff rates on over-quota
shipments are to be reduced to zero over either a 10- or 15-year period.
Finally, Mexico abolished its system of import license requirements as soon as NAFTA entered into
force.  In addition, the U.S. replaced a system of Section 22 quota restrictions on imports of
Mexican agricultural products by TRQs.   Thus, by 2008, trade between Mexico and the U.S. in
13
agricultural products will be completely liberalized, except with respect to sanitary and phytosanitary
regulations.
2. Special Agricultural Safeguards
As has been noted above, both NAFTA and GATT contain safeguard provisions to prevent the
disruption of domestic industries during the transition period.  These include the provisions discussed
above for only a gradual relaxation of TRQs at an annual rate of 3 percent per year.  Amounts
imported in excess of the TRQs are then subject to Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff  rates.   Initial
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TRQs were generally established at import levels experienced during the base period 1989S91, to
ensure that at the beginning of the transition period in 1994 domestic markets in the U.S. and Mexico
would not be disrupted by sudden surges in imports.
3. Export Subsidies
NAFTA identifies agricultural (and all other) export subsidies as inappropriate means for encouraging
trade between countries within the free trade area except to counter subsidized imports from a
country outside of NAFTA to a country within NAFTA.  Thus, Canada and the U.S. will be allowed
to provide subsidized agricultural exports to Mexico to counter competition from subsidized exports
to Mexico from other countries.
4. Internal Support
Both the CFTA and the GATT contain detailed provisions under which participating countries must
reduce domestic support for agriculture in general and specific commodities in particular according
to carefully defined criteria.  In contrast, the NAFTA provisions simply state that the participating
countries should “endeavor” to move toward domestic policies that have minimal effects on patterns
of trade or domestic production, or toward domestic policies exempt from regulation under GATT.
Thus, the clear intent of NAFTA is to allow domestic agricultural policy changes that affect trade to
be mandated under the provisions of GATT rather than through NAFTA.
5.  Grade and Quality Standards
As is well known, countries have often attempted to restrict agricultural imports by applying stringent
grade and quality standards to imports that are not applied to domestic products.  Under NAFTA,TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 21
Mexico and the U.S. have agreed that when either country applies a measure regarding classification,
grading, or marketing of a domestic product destined for processing, it will provide no less favorable
treatment for “like” products imported from the other country for processing.  This is an important
provision that creates a more level playing field for agricultural products from either country in
markets in both countries.
6. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
As discussed above, sanitary and phytosanitary measures were given careful attention in both the
NAFTA and GATT agreements, largely because many countries have perceived such regulations to
be hidden trade barriers.  Under NAFTA, as under GATT, in principle these measures are no longer
to be allowed to function as hidden barriers to trade.  To accomplish this objective, while NAFTA
recognizes each country’s right to establish its own levels of protection to ensure agricultural health,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures must now have a scientific basis and must be applied to both
domestic and imported products.  In addition, regional and local governments within a country are
allowed to impose more stringent standards as long as they are scientifically defensible and
administered in a straightforward and expeditious manner.  A NAFTA Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures has also been established to facilitate trade-related and other issues that arise
in relation to such regulations.
7. Rules of Origin
In multilateral trade agreements, rules of origin are required to prevent nonparticipating countries
from avoiding trade barriers such as higher tariff rates by using a participating country as a
transshipment point.  Incentives for a transshipment through a participating country exist when tariffs
on goods from nonparticipating countries are so high that an exporter in a nonparticipating country
can cover any additional shipping and handling costs by exporting to the participating country of
interest (say the U.S.) via another participating country (say Mexico).  Under NAFTA, commodities
receiving NAFTA preferential treatment must be of North American origin.  Products produced
elsewhere are not to receive NAFTA preferences.  This general rule is qualified only by a de minimus
provision under which some commodities that receive a NAFTA preference may contain a small
amount of the same kind of good from a non-NAFTA source.  For example, some juice concentrates
processed in Florida may contain very small amounts of juice from fruits grown outside of North
America.  The de minimus rule permits such concentrates to be exported to Mexico and to receive
NAFTA preferences with respect to tariffs.
8. Commercial Dispute Resolution
The general NAFTA provisions for dispute resolution have previously been described in some detail.
With respect to agriculture, a trilateral (Canada-U.S.-Mexico) advisory committee on agriculture
has been established to provide a forum for resolving commercial disputes that arise with respect
to transactions in agricultural commodities.  In addition, a three-country joint Committee on
Agricultural Trade has been set up to deal with inter-governmental disputes.  Finally, as noted
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facilitate trade-related and other issues that arise with respect to sanitary and phytosanitary
regulations.
The Agricultural Provisions of GATT
The general agricultural provisions of the 1994 GATT are outlined in Table 3 on the following page.
They are of particular interest because they represent the first (almost) global effort to create a
framework for liberalizing trade in agricultural commodities.  Commodity-specific provisions relevant
to Montana and the Northern Great Plains are described in the next section.  Here, the objective is
to identify the important general provisions of the GATT that have created the framework within
which individual commodity provisions have been developed.  While these general provisions are in
some respects similar to those developed under NAFTA, a major difference between the NAFTA and
GATT agricultural provisions concerns the attention given to domestic price and income support
policies.  The NAFTA provisions include no substantive requirements with respect to domestic
policies that affect agricultural commodity production or trade.  In contrast, the 1994 GATT
explicitly addresses the issue of domestic support for agricultural commodities in several ways.
GATT was finalized and signed by participating countries in April 1994, and came into effect on
January 1, 1995.  With respect to the agricultural provisions, an implementation period of six years
(1995S2000) applies for developed countries.  The 10-year implementation period (1995S2005) for
developing countries is longer partly because many signatories recognized that developing-country
markets are likely to experience more difficulty coping with adjustments toward liberalized
agricultural trade.  In addition, many developing countries were politically unwilling to sign on to a
six-year adjustment period.  Moreover, in many of these countries, the agricultural sector is relatively
small and accounts for only a small part of world agricultural production and consumption, and
international agricultural commodity trade.  Thus, the costs to other countries of allowing developing
countries longer adjustment periods were perceived to be relatively small.
1. Market Access
A major objective of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was to improve access to domestic
markets for agricultural exporters (see, for example, Hathaway and Ingo; Schott; and McCalla).
Most commenters agree that in the end substantial progress was made toward this objective.  Under
the agricultural provisions of the GATT, using the period 1986S88 as the benchmark for tariff rate
reductions and import quota liberalization, the GATT signatories agreed to convert non-tariff barriers
to tariff equivalent barriers and, by the end of the implementation period, to reduce all tariff rates
(including the newly established tariff equivalent rates) by a simple average of 36 percent.  For
example, if a country were levying a simple tariff at the rate of 50 percent on all agricultural exports,
that tariff rate would have to be reduced by 18 percentage points (36 percent of the original tariff rate
of 50 percent, or 50 percent multiplied by 0.36) to 32 percent.TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 23
 Table 3.  GATT: Summary of Agricultural Provisions
IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD:
   P Six years, beginning in 1995 (10 years for developing countries).
MARKET ACCESS:
   P Establish base period of 1986S88.
   P Convert non-tariff barriers to tariff equivalents.
   P Reduce tariffs (including tariff equivalents) by 3 percent on a simple average basis.
   P Establish minimum tariff cut of 15 percent for each product.
   P Require minimum access of 3 percent, expanding to 5 percent of base period domestic consumption for
products covered by non-tariff barriers.
   P Maintain current access for products covered by non-tariff barriers with greater than minimum percent access.
   P Establish special quantity-triggered and price-triggered import safeguards for agricultural products subject to
tariffication.
EXPORT SUBSIDIES:
   P Establish base period of 1986S88.
   P Reduce quantity of subsidized exports by 21 percent from 1986S90 levels.
   P Reduce budgetary outlays for export subsidies by 36 percent from 1986S90 base.
   P Begin reductions from the highest point during 1986S90 levels, or, under certain conditions, the 1991S92
levels.
   P Make reduction commitments on a product-specific basis.
   P Impose budgetary disciplines on export subsidies for processed products.
   P Ban the use of export subsidies for products not subsidized during the base period.
INTERNAL SUPPORT:
   P Establish base period of 1986S88.
   P Reduce total aggregate measure of support (AMS) by 20 percent.
   P Give credit for reductions made since 1986.
   P Establish criteria for non-trade-distorting policies.
   P Provide criteria for production-limiting policies.
SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY (SPS) MEASURES:
   P Base SPS measures on science, using risk-assessment methodologies.
   P Encourage the use of international standards, but recognize the right to use stricter standards.
   P Require transparency in development and implementation of SPS measures.
SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL (S&D) TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
   P Require lesser reduction commitments for developing countries, equal to two-thirds of corresponding
commitment for developed countries, to be implemented over 10 years.
   P Exempt least-developed countries from reduction commitments.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES:
   P Consultations between affected parties may, if needed, proceed to a panel of experts.
   P Once the panel has issued a report, neither party may block the adoption of the report.
   P If the offending party does not implement the recommendations of the report, the complaining party will
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Under GATT, non-tariff barriers implemented via import quotas and/or import licensing arrangements
also had to be adjusted to ensure that immediately upon implementation of GATT, imports would be
guaranteed access to the domestic market in amounts at least equal to 3 percent of domestic
consumption of each product in the base period.  Minimum access guarantees are to be expanded to
at least 5 percent of domestic consumption during the base period by the end of the implementation
period.  In addition, if import access for any commodity already exceeds 5 percent of base period
domestic consumption in 1994, the current access provisions are to be maintained; that is, countries
cannot reduce import quotas below current levels if those levels exceed 5 percent of domestic
consumption in the base period.
Finally, special quantity-triggered and price-triggered safeguards were established for agricultural
products subject to tariffication to prevent excessive disruption of domestic markets by surges of
imports.  The details of the trigger levels for quantities and prices are described in Article 5 of the
GATT agricultural agreement.  The principles are as follows.  Import quantity triggers and import
price triggers have been established for each product subject to market access provisions.  Generally,
trigger quantities are determined in relation to consumption of the product in the base period and the
current level of market access permitted for imports by the country.  The trigger price is typically 90
percent of the average import price at point of entry to the country (c.i.f).   When imports exceed
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the quantity trigger, or when import prices fall below the price trigger, the importing country is
allowed to levy higher tariffs either on all imports (in the case of the quantity trigger) or on specific
import shipments (in the case of the price trigger).  However, tariff rate increases that are introduced
under the safeguard provisions are temporary and must be removed within one year.
According to the GATT agreement, the base period is important in determining the degree of trade
liberalization associated with import access.  As will be seen below, it is also important in relation to
mandated changes in export subsidies and domestic agricultural price and income support programs.
One reason for choosing 1986S88 as the base period was that by 1993, when the agricultural
agreement was hammered out, the two major players in the GATT negotiations over agriculture—the
U.S. and the EU—had already cut tariffs, domestic price and income support programs, and export
subsidies by the amounts required under the GATT agreement relative to the levels that pertained
during the base period.   In the case of the U.S., these cuts were accomplished through the
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provisions of the 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade (FACT) Act, and partly through
the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act.  In the case of the EU, the cuts
were largely accomplished through the 1993 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.  In effect,
the base period was selected to ensure that neither the U.S. nor the EU would have to make radical
adjustments to domestic farm programs or agricultural trade policies.
2. Export Subsidies
Export subsidies distort trading patterns and domestic agricultural production patterns because they
over-stimulate exports and reduce domestic prices in the countries which import the subsidized
commodities.  They also act as “salt in the wounds” in trade negotiations, exacerbating conflicts over
tariff reductions and other import-related trade liberalization measures.  Under GATT, relative to the
1986S1990 base period for export related provisions, the volume of subsidized agricultural exports
has to be reduced by 21 percent.  In addition, budgetary outlays have to be reduced by 36 percentTRADE RESEARCH CENTER 25
from the 1986S1990 base.  The requirement that budget outlays on export subsidies be reduced by
36 percent also applies to processed commodities.  Finally, the use of export subsidies is banned for
commodities that were not subsidized during the base period.  It is worth noting that the funding
provisions for the U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) in the 1996 FAIR Act are in
compliance with GATT export subsidy requirements.  In fact, in 1996, 1997, and 1998, the EEP is
under-funded relative to GATT requirements.
3. Internal Support
The GATT agricultural agreement is remarkable in that it addresses domestic policies that have the
potential to distort trade as well as explicit trade policies such as import tariffs, export subsidies, etc.
The level of support provided to domestic producers of an agricultural commodity can affect the
amount of the commodity that is produced.  Generally, domestic consumption patterns for most
agricultural commodities (and especially food and feed commodities such as corn and wheat) are
relatively stable.   Changes in domestic production patterns caused by domestic agricultural price and
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income support programs therefore tend to result in approximately equivalent changes in either
exports or imports (depending on whether the country is an exporter or importer of the commodity
in the absence of domestic production subsidies).
Subsidies for a commodity can take many forms.  For example, the use of some farm inputs such as
fertilizers may be subsidized, or special loan programs may provide farmers with access to cheap
subsidized credit.  Alternatively, producers may be guaranteed minimum prices for their products
either through floor price schemes which prevent market prices from falling below some
predetermined level (such as the loan rate program in the U.S.) or through deficiency payment
programs under which the market prices received by producers are topped up to a predetermined
level by government payments.
Different countries use very different domestic policies to provide farm price and income supports
(see, for example, Johnson).  Under the GATT, therefore, each country’s subsidies for each
commodity are estimated by an aggregate measure of support (AMS).  Specific procedures to
measure the AMS for each commodity are outlined in Annex 3 of the agricultural agreement.
However, some farm income support programs are not commodity specific.  For example, credit
subsidies in the form of low interest loans for buildings, equipment, and machinery provide incentives
for a general expansion of the agricultural sector.  To account for this problem, each country is
required to develop a non-product specific AMS estimate.  In the U.S., this category includes crop
insurance as well as other types of support.
Under the 1994 GATT, total aggregate measures of support must be reduced by 20 percent from
their 1986S88 base period levels.  As noted before, the policy changes implemented in the U.S. under
the 1990 FACT Act and, to a much lesser degree, the 1996 FAIR Act enabled the U.S. to satisfy
these GATT requirements.  Similarly, the 1993 reform of the EU CAP allowed the EU to comply
with the internal support provisions for almost all commodities without developing new policy
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Some types of income and price support programs are explicitly exempted from the 1994 GATT
AMS disciplines.  These include any direct payments that are based on fixed areas and yields, or on
less than 85 percent of current production, or (in the case of livestock) on fixed numbers of animals.
Thus, for example, the market transition payments authorized under the 1996 FAIR Act will not be
included in any AMSs calculated for the U.S. because they are based on fixed areas and yields that
reflect historical production conditions.  In addition, some other types of programs (described in
detail in Annex 2 of the agricultural agreement) are exempt.  These include the following:
(i) Government funding of general research, research associated with environmental
programs, and commodity-specific research programs.
(ii) Pest and disease control programs.
(iii) Training services (including general and specialist training facilities).
(iv) Extension and advisory services.
(v) Market and promotion services where subsidies are provided for the provision of
general information and advice (although subsidies that effectively reduce prices are
not exempt).
(vi) Inspection services (including health, safety, grading, and standardization services).
(vii) Infrastructure services including electrification, roads and other forms of transport,
port facilities, water supply programs, drainage and other general land improvement
programs, and infrastructural works associated with environmental programs.  In
this  case, exempt subsidies are only associated with “capital works” such as the
construction of dams.  Additional preferential subsidies for the use of services (for
example, subsidized discounts on electricity rates to farms) are not exempt from
AMS measures.
(viii) Public stockholding for food security purposes, including aid for private storage
schemes, as long as such schemes can be shown to exist for purposes of maintaining
adequate food supplies within the country.
(ix) Domestic food aid to sections of a country’s population who are in need, including
subsidies associated with food stamp programs as well as direct gifts of food to the
hungry.
(x) Government participation in: (a) income insurance and income safety net programs,
as long as such payments relate only to income and payments are made only for
losses in excess of 30 percent of average incomes; and (b) crop yield and livestock
loss insurance and disaster assistance programs based on crop losses in excess of 30
percent of average production, where average production is measured on the basis
of production over the past five years.
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(xi) Structural adjustment programs that facilitate the retirement of farmers and/or farm
resources (in particular, land and other resources such as livestock).
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(xii) Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids to assist the
physical restructuring of producers’ operations.
(xiii) Payments made to farmers under environmental and conservation programs.
(xiv) Payments made under regional assistance programs to farmers in areas where it has
been clearly demonstrated that such farmers operate at a substantial disadvantage.
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Several of the above exemptions relate specifically to environmental programs.  Consequently, those
programs have become known as green box programs.  Other exempted programs have become
known as blue box programs.TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 27
Finally, if countries provide minimal support levels for a particular commodity or for agriculture in
general, then, although AMSs are computed for those countries, they do not have to reduce their
levels of domestic support.  The “cutoff” point is an AMS of less than 5 percent; that is, if a
commodity-specific level of support is estimated to be less than 5 percent of what would be the
market value of the commodity in the absence of support, then the country has no obligation under
the GATT to reduce its AMS for that commodity.  In fact, countries may even increase price and
income transfers as long as the AMS for a commodity remains below 5 percent.
4. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Under the GATT agricultural agreement, all participating countries have agreed to adhere to the
provisions of the GATT agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  Such provisions apply
not only to agricultural commodities, but also to other commodities (for example, pharmaceuticals).
The sanitary and phytosanitary agreement has three general themes. The first is that each country has
a sovereign right to establish its own sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.  The second is that those
standards should be based on credible science and not used as an arbitrary means of establishing
barriers to trade.  The third is harmonization.  Toward the goal of establishing common standards
across countries, Article 3 of the sanitary and phytosanitary agreement states that participating
countries agree, to the greatest extent possible, to base their own agreements on the basis of credible
science.  In addition, exemptions are permitted in cases where countries have established pest or
disease free areas or areas of low pest or disease incidence (as is the case in the United Kingdom with
respect to rabies and hoof-and-mouth disease).  However, to facilitate trade, the agreement also
requires countries to recognize equivalent, although possibly legally different, standards in other
countries.  Clearly, the thrust of the sanitary and phytosanitary measures agreement is to create a
framework for removing regulations that only exist for the purpose of creating non-tariff barriers to
trade.
5. Dispute Settlement Procedures
The dispute settlement procedures for agriculture are similar to those for other commodities.  As
noted previously, key provisions were modified and unified in the 1994 agreement with the objective
of making dispute resolution procedures more timely, more efficient, and more effective.  Under the
current procedures (established in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes), as was the case prior to the 1994 GATT, only member nations can initiate
dispute resolution procedures against other countries.  However, private groups within a country can
and do bring potential violations of GATT to the attention of their governments.  Once a nation
initiates a complaint, the dispute resolution procedures operate within specific and tightly defined time
limits.  First, a 60-day period is established during which the parties attempt to resolve the dispute
through consultations.  If consultations fail, the party claiming injury may then request the
establishment of a three-person dispute resolution panel recommended by the WTO Secretariat,
which must be set up within 25 to 60 days of the request.  The panel must issue its report within six
to nine months, and the recommendations, including those concerning any payments for damages,
must be acted upon rapidly.  Failure of the “guilty” party to pay compensation and/or comply with
the recommendation then leads to a finding that the injured party may implement retaliatory measures.TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 27
Implications of NAFTA and GATT
for Major Commodities Produced in Montana
Four commodities are of particular importance to many Montana agricultural producers: wheat,
barley, beef, and sugar.  In a typical year, cash receipts earned by Montana producers from the sale
of crops and livestock products amount to about $1.8 billion.  Cattle and calves account for about
44 percent of this income, wheat for about 28 percent, barley for about 7.5 percent, and sugar beets
for about 3 percent.  Collectively, these four products account for over 80 percent of all Montana
farm income received from marketing farm products.  This section describes and examines the
implications of the commodity-specific provisions of NAFTA and GATT for these four commodities.
To provide the reader with the market context within which the NAFTA and GATT provisions
operate, each subsection begins with a brief description of the U.S. and world markets for each
commodity.
A. Wheat
1. U.S. and World Markets
Trends in world wheat production and consumption over the period 1974/75S1994/95 are presented
in Figure 1.  During that period, annual world wheat production and consumption grew by
approximately the same amount—from about 350 million metric tons to about 550 million metric
tons, an increase of almost 80 percent.  Over the same time period, annual world wheat exports have
increased from about 60 million metric tons to about 100 million metric tons, a somewhat smaller
increase of approximately 67 percent.  Thus, world exports have become slightly less important when
compared to world production, but the size of the international market has increased substantially.
Data on U.S. wheat production, exports, and imports are presented in Figure 2.  Over the period
1974/75S1994/95, annual U.S. wheat production increased from about 47 million metric tons to
about 64 million metric tons, an increase of around 35 percent.  Annual U.S. wheat exports over the
same period increased from about 27 million metric tons to about 33 million metric tons, a more
modest increase of just over 20 percent.  Therefore, over the past 20 years, although U.S. wheat
production and exports have increased, they have increased more slowly than world production and
world exports, and the U.S. share of the world export market has declined.  One important reason
for the difference between the rates of growth of U.S. output and world output for wheat is
technological catch-up.  Innovations in wheat varieties that took place in the U.S. during the green
revolution years of the late 1950s and the 1960s were being adopted in many other countries in the
1970s and 1980s.  Another important reason has been the extensive use of land retirement programs
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      Figure 1.  World Wheat Production, Consumption, and Exports
      (1974/75S S1994/95)
   Source:  USDA/ERS, Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook, 1996.
      Figure 2.  U.S. Wheat Production, Imports, and Exports
      (1974/75S S1994/95)
   Source:  USDA/ERS, Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook, 1996.  Canada (22.05%)
  U.S.  (33.03%)
  Australia (8.00%)
  Argentina (8.00%)
  EU  (17.23%)
  All others (6.26%)
  Former USSR  (5.44%)
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The relatively slow increase in domestic production, coupled with a more rapid increase in domestic
consumption, has reduced the proportion of the U.S. wheat crop available for export; this is one
reason for the decline in the U.S. share of world wheat exports over this period.  Another piece of
this puzzle is the increase in wheat production and exports within the European Union.  Until 1993,
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy provided EU farmers with wheat prices that were typically
more than 50 percent higher than world market prices, so producers in EU member countries like
France and the United Kingdom had large incentives to increase wheat acreage and, through the
heavy use of chemical inputs, wheat yields.  The result was that the EU, which had been an importer
of wheat in the early 1970s, through the use of large export subsidies, had become a large net
exporter of wheat by the beginning of the 1990s.
Data on the shares of world export markets enjoyed by major wheat exporting countries are presented
in Figure 3 for the 1994/95 marketing year.  In that marketing year (as in most marketing years), the
five largest wheat exporters, in declining order of importance, were the U.S. (33.03 percent), Canada
(22.05 percent), the European Union (17.23 percent), Australia (8 percent), and Argentina (8
percent).  The Former Soviet Union (FSU) had a market share of 5.44 percent, but generally exported
wheat to other emerging democracies.  The dominant roles played by the U.S., Canada, and the EU
have led several observers to suggest that at least one or two of these countries may enjoy some
monopoly market power.  In this regard, Canada, because of its single-desk export marketing
program operated by the Canadian Wheat Board, has recently been the focus of particular concern
on the part of U.S. policy makers.  All three major exporters, either explicitly (the U.S. and the EU)
or implicitly (Canada), have operated fairly substantial wheat export subsidy programs over the past
few years.
   Figure 3.  Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour by Major Exporting
   Countries (1994/95)
         Source:  USDA/ERS, Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook, 1996.
Data on the market shares of major wheat importers are presented for the 1994/95 marketing year
in Figure 4.  China (with a 10.46 percent share of total world imports) and the FSU (with 9.13
percent) were the largest importers in that year, followed by Brazil (6.77 percent), Japan (6.46
percent), Egypt (6.15 percent), Algeria (4.62 percent), and South Korea (4.41 percent).  Over 35
percent of all wheat exports were purchased by countries with import market shares of less than 1
percent.30 NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE . . . 
   Figure 4.  Imports of Wheat and Wheat Flour by Major
   Importing Countries (1994/95)
 Source:  USDA/ERS, Wheat Situation and Outlook Yearbook, 1996.
The implications of the above data on world wheat trade data are clear.  While the export side of the
world wheat market is quite concentrated, the import side is not.  On the import side, it is also
important to note that Pacific Rim countries (China, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Indonesia) represent a substantial proportion (about 27 percent) of the total world wheat import
market.  In addition, North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt) remains an important market for
exporters, with a 12 percent market share, in part because of food aid programs.
2. Wheat Provisions of NAFTA and GATT
NAFTA provisions with respect to wheat are as follows.  Prior to the implementation of NAFTA,
Mexico restricted wheat import access by means of import licenses and also applied a 10 percent tariff
on durum wheat imports.  Under NAFTA, Mexico agreed to eliminate all import licenses for wheat
and, in 1994, to apply a common tariff to all wheat imports.  This tariff will gradually be reduced to
zero over a 10-year implementation period between 1994 and 2003.  Mexico imports a modest
amount of wheat from the U.S., typically just under 1 million metric tons per year.  The USDA has
forecast that Mexican imports of U.S. wheat are likely to rise moderately as a result of NAFTA to
between 1.0 and 1.5 million metric tons, although the NAFTA-related effects of trade liberalization
in wheat between Canada and Mexico on U.S. exports to Mexico are not easy to assess.
The GATT provisions with respect to wheat are considerably more complicated.  On the export side,
the EU and the U.S. have agreed to cut subsidies for wheat by 21 percent in terms of volume of
subsidized wheat exports, and by 36 percent in terms of the dollar value of those subsidies.  In
addition, both countries agreed to reduce their AMSs for wheat by 20 percent.  However, by 1994,
both the U.S. and the EU had made all of these adjustments.  Australia does not directly subsidize
wheat exports, nor does it heavily subsidize the production of wheat.   Canada also does not
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provide direct subsidies for wheat exports and recently abolished some of its major wheat subsidy
programs—in particular, its transportation subsidy program known as the CROW rate.  As a result,
Canada has also met its GATT obligation to reduce its AMS by 20 percent.  Thus, the implementation
of GATT in 1994 had minimal immediate effects on the incentives provided by those countries toTRADE RESEARCH CENTER 31
producers and exporters of wheat.  However, it must be noted that the EU CAP reforms implemented
in 1993 were in part a response to the then-expected agricultural provisions of the 1994 GATT.
These reforms have had substantial adverse effects on incentives for wheat production in EU member
countries.  It is also important to note that Canada and Australia market their wheat through export
marketing boards.  These boards, known also as state trading enterprises, use implicit subsidies
to market at least some of their exports, but these subsidies are difficult to measure because of the
confidentiality granted to the boards by their respective governments vis à vis their commercial
transactions.  While the operations of these types of state marketing agencies were not examined
carefully in the Uruguay Round, they are likely to be subject to much closer scrutiny in the mini-
GATT round of negotiations scheduled for the year 2000.
Import access provisions with respect to wheat are as follows for the major importing countries that
are members of GATT.  Tariff rates on all commodities have to be reduced and import access
expanded in most cases.  With respect to Pacific Rim countries, in Japan, while the tariff rate quota
(TRQ) for wheat is only to be expanded from 5.565 million metric tons in 1995 to 5.740 million
metric tons in 2000, the tariff rate on imports over that amount will be cut by 15 percent.  In South
Korea, tariffs on wheat imports are to be cut by 25 percent by 2004, and in the Phillippines, tariff
rates are to be cut by 40 percent (from an initial level of 50 percent to 30 percent by 2004).  No
changes in wheat trade policies will be implemented by Indonesia and China.  In the case of China,
this is because it has not yet joined the World Trade Organization, although negotiations over its
entry into the WTO are beginning.
Other countries that import relatively large quantities of wheat include Brazil, where the TRQ will
not change from its current level of about 2 million metric tons, but tariffs on over-quota imports will
be reduced by about one-third.  In Mexico, the TRQ will also not be measurably increased, and over-
quota tariff rates, which are currently 73 percent, will be reduced only to 67 percent.  As the tariff
rates for U.S. and Canadian wheat negotiated under NAFTA are much lower and NAFTA imports
are not subject to quota restrictions, the provisions of the GATT are unlikely to increase the
competition faced by U.S. producers from the EU and Australian producers in the Mexican wheat
market.  In North Africa, GATT had no real effect on wheat import restrictions in Egypt or Morocco,
nor were there any GATT-related impacts on wheat import trade policies in the FSU—again because
most FSU countries are not yet members of the WTO.  Thus, for U.S. wheat producers, the
implications of the GATT are relatively modest but generally favorable.  Some countries will reduce
tariff rates for wheat over the implementation period and/or improve import access to domestic
markets.  These adjustments are likely to encourage modest increases in world demand for wheat
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B. Barley
1. U.S. and World Markets
Trends in U.S. barley production, exports, and imports over the period 1975/76S1994/95 are
presented in Figure 5.  Annual domestic production increased between 1975/76 and 1985/86 from
about 8 million metric tons to about 13 million metric tons, but subsequently declined.  By the end
of the period, it had returned to about the same level as in 1975/76.  Domestic consumption also
remained stable.  U.S. exports of barley also remained relatively constant over this period at about
1.3 million metric tons (although with peaks and valleys), or about 17 percent of domestic
production.  In the early 1990s, imports of barley (which were negligible prior to the 1990s) began
to increase, also to about 1.3 million metric tons, mainly from Canada as a result of trade
liberalization under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
         Figure 5.  U.S. Barley Production, Imports, and Exports
         (1975/76S S1994/95)
    Source:  USDA/ERS, Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook, December 1995.
In world markets, as illustrated in Figure 6, the supply side of the world export market for barley
is dominated by four major exporting countries: the European Union, Canada, the U.S., and
Australia.  In the 1994/95 market year, these countries’ export market shares were as follows: the
market share for the EU was 39.73 percent, for Canada 18.49 percent, for the U.S. 9.59 percent, and
for Australia 8.22 percent.  Other exporting countries jointly enjoyed an export market share of about
24 percent.  As illustrated in Figure 7, major importers of barley include Saudi Arabia (with an import
market share of 23.97 percent), Japan (10.62 percent), China (10.27 percent), the Former Soviet
Union (7.45 percent), and other Eastern Europe countries (4.72 percent).  Imports to all other
countries accounted for the residual 43 percent of the market.  EU (39.73%)
  Other (23.97%)
  Canada (18.49%)
  U.S. (9.59%)
  Australia (8.22%)
  Saudi Arabia (23.97%)
  Others (42.97%)
  China (10.27%)
  Former FSU (7.45%)
  Eastern Europe (4.72%)   Japan (10.62%)
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Figure 6.  Major Barley Exporters (1994/95)
Source:  USDA/ERS, Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook, December 1995.
Figure 7.  Major Barley Importers (1994/95)
Source:  USDA/ERS, Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook, December 1995.
As in the case of wheat, although to a somewhat lesser degree, the export side of the world barley
market is characterized by a relatively small number of large exporting countries, while, with the
exception of Saudi Arabia, the import side is characterized by a relatively large number of importing
countries, none of which purchases a large share of world production.  On the export side, the EU
and Canada (which also markets all barley exports through its single selling desk agency, the
Canadian Wheat Board) have the largest market shares and the greatest ability to exercise monopoly
market power.
2. Barley Provisions of NAFTA and GATT
Historically, Mexico has levied high tariffs and implemented quantity restrictions via import licensing
arrangements for barley imports from Canada and the U.S.  Under NAFTA, Mexico allocated an
initial import quota of 120,000 metric tons per year to U.S. barley producers on which no tariffs were
levied.  Between 1994 and 2004, this duty-free quota will be increased by 5 percent per year to about
195,000 metric tons in 2004.  In 1994, over-quota barley imports (that is, imports in excess of the
quota) will confront a tariff equal to the greater of either $212 per metric ton ($4.60 per bushel) or34 NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE . . . 
a tariff rate of 175 percent of the c.i.f price at point of entry into Mexico.  However, this over-quota
tariff on barley is scheduled to be reduced to zero by 2004.  Over time, U.S. and Canadian producers
are likely to enjoy increased demand for their commodity from Mexican importers.
The GATT provisions for barley are similar to those for wheat.  On the export side of the
marketplace, the EU is required to reduce its AMS for barley by 20 percent (relative to the 1986S90
base period), to cut its volume of subsidized barley exports by 20 percent, and to reduce the dollar
value of its export subsidies for barley by 36 percent.  It has accomplished the AMS and export
subsidy value objectives through the 1993 reforms of the CAP.  In addition, it is likely to meet its
commitment to reduce the volume of its subsidized exports because, in major cereal growing areas
within the EU, over the past five years farmers have reduced barley acreages in order to comply with
new set-aside provisions introduced under the 1993 CAP reforms.  The U.S. has a similar
commitment to reduce its AMS for barley by 20 percent and to cut export subsidies by the same
proportions as the EU.  These goals have been accomplished through the provisions of the 1990
FACT Act and the 1996 FAIR Act.  Canada is required to reduce its barley AMS by 20 percent (an
objective largely accomplished through the abolition of grain transportation subsidies in 1995), to cut
import tariffs by 36 percent, and to increase import quotas from 299,000 metric tons to 399,000
metric tons.  However, these provisions do not apply to the U.S., whose access to Canada’s barley
market is determined by the terms of the CFTA.  Australia has no commitments with respect to barley
under GATT.
On the import side, access to Saudi Arabia’s barley market is unaffected by GATT because
Saudi Arabia is not a member of the WTO.  Japan has committed to increase its TRQ for barley
minimally from 1.327 million metric tons to 1.369 million metric tons by the year 2000, and to reduce
the tariff rate on over-quota imports by 15 percent.  The other major importers, China and the FSU,
are also not currently members of the WTO; therefore, at this time the GATT has had no effect on
market access and trade in barley in relation to those countries.  However, China is beginning
negotiations to join the WTO and, if it does become a WTO member, the terms that are negotiated
with respect to barley will have important ramifications for world barley markets and U.S. barley
exports.
On balance, therefore, the effects of the current GATT on U.S. barley exports and imports are likely
to be modest.  Perhaps the most important aspect of the 1994 GATT concerns EU reductions in
barley export subsidies.  The 1993 CAP reforms have substantially reduced barley exports from the
EU, creating opportunities for the other major exporters (Canada, the U.S., and Australia) in import
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C. Beef and Cattle
1. U.S. and World Markets
Trends in world production, consumption, and exports of red meat over the period 1975S1991 are
shown in Figure 8.  Both world production and world consumption have steadily increased over
this period, from about 84 million metric tons in 1975 to about 120 million metric tons in 1991,
an increase of about 43 percent.  World exports have also increased over the same period, from
about 5 million metric tons to about 8 million metric tons, at approximately the same rate as
production and consumption.  Trends in U.S. production, exports, and imports of beef and veal for
the period 1970S1994 are shown in Figure 9.  Although U.S. production of these meats has
fluctuated over time in accordance with the beef cycle, the long-run trend has been one of only
modest growth because output has increased from about 9.7 million metric tons to about 10.8 million
metric tons, a rise of around 11 percent over a 25-year period.  U.S. imports of beef and veal have
remained relatively stable, amounting to just over 1 million metric tons in most years.  However, U.S.
beef and veal exports have increased from almost nothing in 1970 to close to 1 million metric tons
in 1994.
      Figure 8.  World Red Meat Production, Consumption, and
      Exports (1975S S1991)



























1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994
Year
US production US imports US exports
36 NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE . . . 
      Figure 9.  U.S. Beef and Veal Production, Imports, and
      Exports (1970S S1994)
Source:  USDA/ERS, Red Meat Yearbook, July 1995.
In world markets in 1994, as illustrated in Figure 10, on the supply side of the market, major net
exporters  of beef and veal included (in descending order) Australia (1.164 million metric tons), the
23
European Union (0.779 million metric tons), New Zealand (0.462 million metric tons), Argentina
(0.357 million metric tons), and Brazil (0.298 million metric tons).  Figure 11 shows that major net
importers include Japan (0.843 million metric tons), the Former Soviet Union (0.365 million metric
tons), the U.S. (0.345 million metric tons), and Korea (0.170 million metric tons).  Mexico (0.108
million metric tons) and Canada (0.060 million metric tons) are also net importers.
The world beef market is complex.  Many countries with relatively large exports of beef also are large
importers.  This is certainly the case for the U.S., which is both the largest producer and the largest
consumer of beef in the world, and for other countries such as the members of the EU, Canada, and
Mexico.  One reason for this phenomenon is that beef exports and imports are often very different
in terms of quality.  For example, historically the U.S., Canada, and the EU have imported processed
beef products, such as corned beef from Argentina and other South and Central American countries.
On the other hand, the U.S. has exported large quantities of prime beef cuts to other markets.  Thus,
changes in trade policies by both exporters and importers have potentially complex implications for
U.S. beef producers and consumers.Brazil (298 )
Argentina (357 )
Central America (81 )
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Figure 10.  World Beef and Veal Net Exporters (1994)
(1,000 metric tons, carcass weight)
  Source:  USDA/ERS, Red Meat Yearbook, July 1995.
Figure 11.  World Beef and Veal Net Importers (1994)
(1,000 metric tons, carcass weight)
  Source:  USDA/ERS, Red Meat Yearbook, July 1995.
2. Beef Provisions of NAFTA and GATT
Under the NAFTA agreement, the U.S. and Mexico have simply exempted each other from their
respective import laws.  Prior to NAFTA, Mexico did not impose tariffs on live cattle or beef imports,
so NAFTA had no effect on U.S. exports of these products to Mexico.  Mexico did, however, impose
a 20 percent tariff on imports of edible offals (which include brains, heart, liver, etc.).  This tariff will
be phased out between 1994 and 2003.  The U.S. fulfilled its part of the NAFTA agreement by
immediately abolishing a 2¢ per pound tariff on all imports of fresh, chilled, and frozen beef, and a
1¢ per pound tariff on imported feed and feeder cattle.  These tariffs were modest, so their abolition
has had minimal effects on incentives for Mexican cattle producers and beef processors to export beef
and beef cattle to the U.S.  Under NAFTA, the Canadian government also agreed to abolish tripartite
price supports for livestock producers, although the tripartite program had been heavily criticized for
some time as ineffective by Canadian cattle producers.38 NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE . . . 
Under the GATT agreement, several major beef-producing countries made commitments to reduce
trade restrictions and/or internal supports.  The U.S. has agreed to expand its TQR from about 0.634
million metric tons to about 0.656 million metric tons.  These imports are subject to an in-quota tariff
of $44 per metric ton (2¢ per pound).  Over-quota imports were subject to a tariff of $469 per ton
in 1994; this tariff will be reduced by 15 percent to $399 per metric ton by the year 2000.  Access to
U.S. exports by non-NAFTA producers has therefore not been expanded to any substantial degree.
Since the U.S. provides relatively little direct support to the beef industries, under GATT the U.S.
is not required to make adjustments in its beef AMS.
The same cannot be said for some other major beef exporters.  The EU has historically provided
substantial subsidies to beef producers, and under GATT is required to reduce its beef AMS by 20
percent.  It also subsidizes most of its beef exports and must reduce the volume of subsidized
exports by 22 percent and the value of its subsidies to beef producers by 36 percent.  Canada is also
required to reduce its beef AMS by 20 percent and to reduce its tariffs on beef imports, but these
adjustments are unlikely to have major effects on access to Canadian markets by non-NAFTA beef
exporters.
Among beef-importing countries, Japan has agreed to reduce its beef AMS by 20 percent and to
reduce tariff rates on beef imports by half from the current level of 93 percent.  South Korea has
agreed to double its TRQ for beef from 123,000 metric tons to 225,000 metric tons between 1995
and 2000.  In addition, its tariff rate on over-quota beef imports will be reduced from 44.5 percent
to 40 percent.  Finally, the Former Soviet Union’s trade restrictions on beef imports are unaffected
by the 1994 GATT because it is not a member of the WTO.
With the exception of the constraints placed on EU beef prices and income supports and export
subsidies, neither NAFTA nor GATT are likely to have major impacts on the world or the U.S. beef
markets in the short to medium term.  If, however, future GATT negotiations result in continued
reductions in import tariffs and expanded import quotas, especially among Pacific Rim countries,
world beef trade could expand substantially over the next 10 to 15 years.
D. Sugar
1. U.S. and World Markets
Trends in U.S. sugar production, imports, and exports for the period 1985S1994 are presented in
Figure 12.  Over this 10-year period, U.S. production of beet and cane sugar has increased from just
over 6 million short tons to about 7.7 million short tons, an increase of approximately 28 percent.
In contrast, exports have remained relatively stable at about 0.5 million short tons (approximately 6
percent of domestic production).  U.S. imports have fluctuated over the period but exhibit
no long-run trends.  Currently, the U.S. imports about 1.8 million metric tons of sugar, or
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       Figure 12.  U.S. Sugar Production, Imports, and Exports
       (1985S S1994)
   Source:  USDA/ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook 1995, January 1996.
Data on world sugar production in 1995/96 are presented in Figure 13.  In 1995/96, total world cane
and beet sugar production amounted to about 144 million metric tons, of which about 5.76 percent
was produced in the U.S.  In contrast, South and Central America together produced about 18.65
percent of world output, and the EU’s share was about 14.41 percent.  Countries and regions with
relatively large shares of world output include the Caribbean (4.25 percent), Mexico (3.6 percent),
Sub-Saharan Africa (4.58 percent), Oceania—which includes Australia and New Zealand (4.65
percent), and the FSU (5.46 percent).  In addition, the Asian countries account for 31.24 percent of
world production.
Major sugar exporting regions for the 1995/96 crop year are shown in Figure 14.  Asia is the largest
exporting region (18.87 percent) but, as shown in Figure 15, is also the largest importing region,
purchasing over 30 percent of all world exports.  On a net basis, then, Asia is a substantial sugar
importer.  In contrast, the three largest exporting regions (Figure 14) on a net basis are South
America (with an export share of 18.82 percent), Oceania (with an export share of 14.45 percent),
and the Caribbean (with an export share of 12.44 percent).  The EU is also a substantial net exporter,
providing 14.67 percent of world exports and importing 7.13 percent of total world imports.  The
EU’s role as both an exporter and importer arises from the terms under which the UK entered the EU
in 1973.  Under those terms, the UK maintained import quotas that guaranteed ex-British colonies
access to UK markets.  These quotas, known as Commonwealth preferences, are still maintained and
give countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad access to UK markets at EU prices.  As EU prices have
generally been substantially higher than world market prices under the EU CAP, the Commonwealth










Other Western Europe (0.11%)
Sub-Saharan Africa (4.58%)
Former Soviet Union  (5.46%)













Former Soviet Union  (6.32%)
Middle East (0.16%)
Central Europe (1.02%)
European Union (EU) (14.67%)
40 NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE . . . 
Figure 13.  World Sugar Production by Region
(1995/96)
Source:  USDA/ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook 1995, January 1996.
Figure 14.  World Sugar Exports by Region
(1995/96)
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On the import side, as illustrated in Figure 15, Asia is the largest importer, with a market share of
30.65 percent, followed by the FSU (15.77 percent), the Middle East (13.29 percent), North Africa
(8.08 percent), the EU (7.13 percent), and the U.S. (7.03 percent).  Canada is also a substantial
importer of sugar, with a market share of 3.63 percent.  These countries and regions are also large
net exporters of sugar (Figure 14).
Figure 15.  World Sugar Imports by Region
(1995/96)
  Source:  USDA/ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook 1995, January 1996.
The world market for sugar, along with those for dairy products and textiles, has been regarded as
one of the agricultural markets most affected by domestic price and income support policies and
explicit trade restrictions.  Sugar imports in the U.S. have been subject to trade restrictions since
1790.  Since the New Deal, with only a brief hiatus in the late 1970s, U.S. sugar imports have also
been heavily restricted by import quotas and/or large tariffs.  Currently, both country-specific quotas
and large tariffs are utilized to provide U.S. producers with domestic market prices well in excess of
world market prices.  The history of intervention in sugar markets is almost as long for EU member
countries.  Napoleon introduced a sugar program in France and its satellite states in the early 1800s
that essentially created the Western European sugar industry.  Since 1968, EU sugar policy has
involved a complex system of import quotas coupled with high tariffs, domestic production quotas,
and large export subsidies for the disposal of surplus production.  That system has been heavily trade
distorting.  Thus, at least in the initial trade negotiations, sugar was a prime target for trade
liberalization by many countries participating in the Uruguay GATT negotiations.
2. Sugar Provisions of NAFTA and GATT
Sugar proved to be controversial under both NAFTA and GATT.  During NAFTA negotiations, U.S.
sugar producers lobbied extensively for special treatment, concerned that a rapid reduction in import
tariffs would lead to a flood of imports into the U.S. from Mexico and cause a sharp drop in U.S.
prices.  Under NAFTA, trade both in sugar and sugar-containing products is subject to extensive
provisions.  The provisions for sugar itself are as follows.  If, in a given year during the 15-year
transition period for sugar (1994S2009), domestic production in Mexico is less than domestic42 NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE . . . 
consumption, then duty-free imports of sugar from Mexico into the U.S. are subject to the pre-
NAFTA highly restrictive quota of 7,258 metric tons.  If, during any one the first six years of the
transition period (1994S1999), Mexico’s production of sugar exceeds its domestic consumption of
sugar and high fructose corn syrups, then it will be accorded net surplus producer status and its
duty-free sugar quota will increase to 25,000 metric tons.  Thereafter (between 2000 and 2009),
assuming Mexico remains a net surplus producer, its U.S. import quota will be expanded to 250,000
metric tons, or about 18 percent of current total U.S. sugar imports.
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Throughout the transition period, over-quota imports from Mexico will be subject to a “second tier”
tariff.  This tariff, at 16¢ per pound, is applied to all over-quota imports from non-NAFTA countries
and is usually substantially in excess of the world sugar price, which has been as low as 7¢ per pound
in some years.  Between 1994 and 1999, under NAFTA, the U.S. has agreed to reduce the over-
quota tariff on Mexican imports by 15 percent (to 13.6¢ per pound); the tariff will be phased out
between 2000 and 2009.  These trade policy adjustments are likely to have minimal effects on the
U.S. sugar industry over the first six years of the 15-year transition period.  However, the long-run
effects of the NAFTA sugar agreement are likely to be much more substantial.  While U.S. domestic
prices are likely to remain above world market levels as long as the tariff on non-NAFTA sugar
remains in place, it is conceivable that at the end of the 15-year adjustment period, imports of sugar
from Mexico may increase significantly, reducing domestic prices somewhat and leading to a
contraction in U.S. sugar production.  The quantitative size of these effects is disputed, but they are
likely to be substantial.  One mitigating factor is Mexico’s NAFTA obligation to align its tariff regime
for sugar vis à vis non-NAFTA countries with that of the U.S. by 1999, and also to remove all tariffs
on Mexican imports of U.S. sugar between 2000 and 2009.  The agreement between the two
countries to align their tariff structures for sugar in relation to non-NAFTA producers is likely to
preclude the possibility of backdoor imports from non-NAFTA countries to the U.S. through Mexico.
The NAFTA agreement also includes provisions for U.S. imports of sugar-containing products from
Mexico.  At the beginning of the transition period, minimal quotas were established for products such
as blended syrups, cocoa, candy, etc.  These quotas are to be increased by 3 percent per year over
a 10-year transition period (1994S2003).  Over-quota imports were initially subject to large tariffs
of between 91.2 and 120.3 percent.  These tariffs are to be phased out over the 10-year transition
period.
The GATT provisions for sugar are also complex, but in general are likely to have smaller effects on
world trade in sugar and the U.S. domestic sugar market.  Among major net exporters, Australia is
required to reduce its sugar AMS by 20 percent and to reduce tariffs on imports of sugar from 55
percent to 28 percent.  However, during the base period of 1986S88, Australian tariffs on sugar
imports were only about 11 percent.  Thus, the effects of GATT on Australian sugar production and
sugar exports are likely to be minimal.  The story for the EU is a little different.  The EU is also
required to reduce its sugar AMS by 20 percent.  However, sugar production subject to large income
transfers in the EU is also constrained by production quotas, so sugar production may not change
very much.  EU import tariffs also must be reduced by 26 percent, and the volume of subsidized
imports must be reduced by 21 percent.  However, the effects of these provisions on actual subsidies
are also expected to be very small.  Finally, because of the EU’s existing system of relatively large
import quotas for Commonwealth preference countries, there will be no expanded access to EU
markets under GATT, at least not until after the year 2000.TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 43
The U.S. GATT obligations with respect to sugar are as follows.  The U.S. has agreed to reduce
tariffs on sugar imports by 15 percent from its base tariff rate of 18¢ per pound, which is higher
than its current tariff rate of 16¢ per pound.  Therefore, the effects of GATT on U.S. sugar tariff
rates are minimal.  In addition, the U.S. import quota for sugar will not change during the GATT
implementation period.  Given that the U.S. is a large net importer of sugar and that the Uruguay
Round of the GATT resulted in no imperatives for change in U.S. sugar trade policy, the effects of
the 1994 GATT on U.S. sugar producers are virtually nil.  As noted previously, however, this is not
the case for sugar with respect to NAFTA.
Conclusion
This special report has described the historical development and the general provisions of the two
major multilateral trade agreements negotiated by the U.S. government during the 1970s: NAFTA
and GATT.  Disputes arose because, while export industries stood to benefit from both multilateral
trade agreements, import-competing industries stood to lose as a result of increased competition from
foreign producers.  The main sections of this paper have concentrated on the provisions of NAFTA
and GATT in relation to agriculture.  The first of these sections described the general agricultural
provisions of the two agreements; the second described the implications of the detailed provisions for
wheat, barley, beef, and sugar, and briefly discussed their implications for U.S. and Montana
producers of those commodities.
The effects of NAFTA on the U.S. beef and grains industries are likely to be modest and, on a net
basis, may be favorable.  Over the longer run, toward the end of the 15-year adjustment period, the
implications of NAFTA for U.S. sugar producers may be more substantial because of the potential
for competition in U.S. markets from Mexican sugar producers.  The GATT agreement may also
provide U.S. beef and grains producers with benefits from increased access to important import
markets in Asia and Europe, especially if satisfactory protocols for the implementation of the GATT
sanitary and phytosanitary provisions can be developed.  The effects of the 1994 GATT on U.S. sugar
producers, however, are likely to be small because minimal changes have been made with respect to
sugar tariff policies and market access provisions.44 NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE . . . 
Endnotes
1. Concerns about avoiding conflict were particularly important in leading the original members of
the European Economic Community (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
Holland) to create an environment in which citizens of those countries could more easily trade
with one another.  They are also an important consideration in the debates over whether the
current European Union should be expanded to include emerging democracies in Eastern Europe
such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and initiatives to encourage trade between
Pacific Rim countries such as Korea, Japan, and China (Swann).
2. See Rayner, Ingersent, and Hine for a discussion of these issues.
3. See “Canadian Trade Policy …” (The Economist) for a discussion of these issues.
4. Key sources for the material presented in this section are the U.S. General Accounting Office,
and Huffbauer and Schott.
5. A Free Trade Area consists of a group of countries that agree to remove tariffs and other
barriers to trade among themselves, but each country maintains its own set of tariffs and trade
relationships with “third” countries who are not members of the Free Trade Area.  Many such
arrangements are legal under the GATT.
6. The NAFTA Trilateral Commission is modeled after the Bilateral Commission, which is
responsible for dispute settlement under the CFTA (Article 1101, Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 1987).
7. The CFTA has a similar set of arrangements for dispute settlement.  The bilateral Joint Canada-
U.S. Commission on Grains, which was established in 1994 to examine grain flows from Canada
to the U.S. and make policy recommendations, is an example of such a commission.
8. The other agreements include (a) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, (b) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and (c) the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal.
9. The European Union, initially called the European Economic Community and later described as
the European Community, was founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1958, and at that time included
France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg as members.  Harmonization of
agricultural policies began in 1962, and a Common Agricultural Policy, which included very
large import tariffs and export subsidies for many agricultural commodities, was established in
1967.
10. It is most doubtful that the U.S. Congress would have ratified a GATT agreement incorporating
such radical changes in farm programs.TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 45
11. The Cairns Group, established in 1986, included Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay.  It
was formed to give these countries a more effective voice in the Uruguay Round, especially in
relation to agriculture.  However, as in the past, crucial decisions about the provisions of the
1994 GATT were made largely as a result of bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and the EU.
12. This section draws heavily on Schott, and on the GATT Secretariat.
13. Under Section 22 of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, the U.S. Congress may introduce
restrictions on imports of agricultural commodities to prevent such imports from increasing the
cost of agricultural price and income support programs.  In this context, a system of quotas,
called Section 22 quotas, was established to restrict U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico.
14. Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rates are levied on imports from non-NAFTA countries who
are signatories to the GATT.  The term MFN derives from a GATT provision that countries
must levy tariffs on imports from all other signatory countries at the lowest tariff rate offered to
the “most favored nation.”  Exemptions to this principle, however, have been negotiated under
GATT by members of free trade areas, customs unions, and common markets such as the
European Union, and for preferential tariff rates for imports by developed countries from less
developed countries.
15. The acronym c.i.f. stands for cash, insurance, and freight.  A c.i.f. price is a price that includes
payment for the product (cash) and insurance and shipping and handling costs (insurance and
freight).
16. The base period for export subsidy provisions is 1986S90 rather than 1986S88.  One reason for
choosing a longer base period for export subsidies may have been that exports exhibit more year-
to-year volatility than domestic production and consumption patterns.
17. Domestic demand for most agricultural commodities (especially in developed economies such
as the U.S.) is “own-price” inelastic; that is, changes in the price of the product cause only
relatively small changes in domestic consumption.
18. Currently, U.S. federal disaster assistance payments are excluded from all AMS measures, but
federal crop insurance subsidies are included in the general U.S. AMS.
19. For example, payments made to farmers under the Conservation Reserve Program are exempt
from the GATT disciplines on aggregate measures of support.  Similarly, payments made under
programs such as the federal dairy herd buyout program implemented during the early 1980s
would also be exempt.
20. Several European Union programs are specifically designed to provide various forms of
assistance to farmers with low incomes in regions where the general population and agricultural
producers are economically disadvantaged.46 NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE . . . 
21. Montana, for example, is a state with one of the largest participation rates in the CRP.
22. A large Australian wheat subsidy program that operated throughout most of the post-World War
II period was abandoned in 1984.
23. Net exports are defined as the difference between a country’s exports of the commodity and its
imports of the commodity.  Although both the U.S. and the EU export substantial quantities of
beef, on a net basis they are importers; that is, both countries’ beef exports are less than their
beef imports (see Figures 10 and 11, p. 37).
24. A country’s net surplus position with respect to sugar is calculated by including high fructose
corn syrup consumption with sugar consumption, but not high fructose corn syrup production
with sugar production.  This has caused serious concern among U.S. sugar producers because
of the high levels of high fructose corn syrup consumption in the U.S.TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 47
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